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Este trabajo apunta a contribuir a la comprensión del sentido como inhe-
rentemente impreciso e inestable excepto cuando se lo estudia como el pro-
ceso activo en el cual el discurso establece relaciones léxicas. La imprecisión 
y la inestabilidad semántica en cuanto a referencia fue investigada por 
Eleanor Rosch (1973, 1978). Rosch descubrió que las categorías conceptua-
les no poseen límites definidos. Esta misma falta de estabilidad en las cate-
gorías es lo que adjudica Hanks (2008) a las palabras. Hanks sostiene que el 
sentido de las palabras proviene de componentes semánticos que se activan 
en contexto, donde el contexto sirve para desambiguar la composición se-
mántica de una palabra en uso. Aunque algunos componentes se activan 
mediante disparadores contextuales, definir qué componentes se encuen-
tran activos rara vez resulta sencillo. Esa es precisamente la tarea que las 
relaciones léxicas llevan a cabo en contexto. Las relaciones léxicas han sido 
estudiadas desde diversas perspectivas: desde Lyons hasta Cruse 
(Geeraerts, 2010, p. 82) y desde la lingüística generativa (Radford et al., 
2009, p. 170) hasta la lingüística funcional (Halliday, 2014, p. 644). Todos 
estos lingüistas analizan los cuatro tipos clásicos de relaciones léxicas: hi-
perónimo-hipónimo, holónimo-merónimo, sinonimia y antonimia. El análi-
sis tradicional de estas relaciones léxicas ha sido fuera del contexto discur-
sivo. Una excepción es el libro Opposition in Discourse de Jeffries (2010). 
Jeffries sostiene que pares de palabras pueden crear relaciones de oposición 
en virtud de su contexto lingüístico. La postura del presente trabajo es que 
todas las relaciones léxicas se construyen en los textos, no solo la antoni-
mia. Esta visión permite apreciar con mayor especificidad tanto la flexibili-
dad como la indefinición del sentido, pero a la vez contribuye a la com-
prensión del proceso mediante el cual se desambigua el sentido en tanto la 
instauración de relaciones léxicas discursivas. 
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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the understanding of meaning as inherently vague and 
indeterminate except when seen as the active process in which discourse sets up 
lexical sense relations. Vagueness and indeterminacy in reference was studied by 
Eleanor Rosch (1973, 1978). She found that conceptual categories do not have 
sharp boundaries. This same indeterminacy in categories has been ascribed to 
words by Hanks (2008). He contends that word meaning is made up of components 
which are activated by the context, where the context may help disambiguate the 
semantic composition of a word in use. Even though some components are 
activated by contextual triggers, discriminating which components are active is 
rarely straightforward. This is precisely the kind of task lexical relations effect in 
context. Lexical relations have been studied from various perspectives: from Lyons 
to Cruse (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 82) and from generative linguistics (Radford et al., 
2009, p. 170) to functional linguistics (Halliday, 2014, p. 644). All discuss the four 
classic types: superordination-hyponymy, holonymy-meronymy, synonymy and 
antonymy. Traditionally, these relationships have been analysed in isolation, i.e. 
not as part of discourse. One exception is Jeffries’s Opposition in Discourse 
(2010). Jeffries argues pairs of words may enter into oppositional relationship by 
virtue of their textual surroundings. The contention here is that all sense relations 
are constructed in texts, not just antonymy. This view helps appreciate more 
accurately both the flexibility and the fuzziness of meaning, but it also contributes 
to understanding the processes of meaning disambiguation as instantiated by 
lexical relations in discourse. 
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This paper contributes to the understanding of meaning creation seen 
as the active process by which discourse sets up lexical sense relations in 
context. Sense relations at the lexical level have been analysed from various 
perspectives: from Lyons to Cruse (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 82) and from 
generative linguistics (Radford et al., 2009, p. 170) to functional linguistics 
(Halliday, 2014, p. 644). All studies include the four classic types: 
superordination-hyponymy, holonymy-meronymy, synonymy and 
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antonymy. Traditionally, these relationships have been studied in isolation, 
i.e. not as part of discourse. Exceptions are some studies on antonymy, 
notably Jeffries’s Opposition in Discourse (2010). Jeffries argues pairs of 
words may enter into oppositional relationship by virtue of their textual 
surroundings, and she calls this relationship “constructed opposition” (p. 
1). The contention here is that all sense relations are constructed in texts, 
not just antonymy, and that this view helps appreciate more accurately 
both the flexibility and the fuzziness of meaning. 
In order to understand lexical relations more thoroughly, it is 
instructive to draw on categorisation studies. To find out if a word, or 
rather a concept, is a superordinate, a hyponym, a meronym, a synonym or 
an antonym, it is necessary to make a categorisation decision, or basically 
to decide what something is, such as “love” or “fruit”. Thanks to the 
studies conducted by Eleanor Rosch (1973, 1978) on conceptual categories, 
we now understand that categories do not have sharp boundaries, and that 
this decision might prove tricky. Her discovery entails that categories are 
organised around prototypes, or “best” or “most typical” examples. This is 
why, for example, when people think of a penguin they rarely believe it is 
the most frequent representative of the category of “birds”, but sparrows 
and robins are. Seen from a different perspective, this means that when 
language users try to interpret a conceptual category they are capable of 
handling a range of possibilities that go from very good examples, such as 
apple or orange as “fruit”, to less good examples, such as tomato or lemon that 
fit the conceptual category in question more or less accurately. This range 
naturally contributes to fuzziness as, when interpreting the concept “piece 
of furniture,” a language user may be considering options such as chair and 
sofa, but also TV set or lamp. Indeed, Rosch’s studies go to show how vague 
concepts can be. This view is reinforced by findings of linguists specialized 
in lexicography. Patrick Hanks (2008), in his revealing article “Do Word 
Meanings Exist?”, contends words in use have “meaning potentials” (p. 
130) and that “text meanings arise from combinations, not from any one 
word individually”. In this context, it becomes tempting to postulate 
language is an excessively tricky tool for communication. If the 
representation of concepts and meaning is so elusive, how do we make 
sense of language? A partial answer to this question may lie in lexical sense 
relations. While it seems to be quite evident that language is inherently 
vague and fuzzy, this indeterminacy may be countered by something that 
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functions as part of a veritable system of checks and balances, otherwise 
known as linguistic context.  
2. Lexical Sense Relations 
As stated in the introductory paragraph, sense relations have been 
studied mostly in isolation, but they may also be successfully studied in 
linguistic context. To do this, it is necessary to describe each category in 
greater detail and focus on the basic features of each sense relation to draw 
certain conclusions. 
2.1. Superordination   
The basic feature of the superordinate-hyponym relationship is that the 
superordinate has to be an entity of a higher order that includes any 
number of members that can be referred to by the more general 
superordinate, for example, “tree”. The set of hyponyms are referred to as 
co-hyponyms and are consistently perceived as being an open-ended 
category. On the other hand, co-hyponyms, such as apple tree and pear tree 
can be conceived as examples that realise the superordinate “tree” more 
specifically. In most cases, then, an entity will be identified as a co-
hyponym if it shares some basic features with other co-hyponyms so that it 
may be subsumed under the same superordinate. This discussion seems 
quite close to the one about conceptual categories and fuzzy boundaries. 
More to the point, is there a definite number of features which are 
necessary for a conceptual category to be included in a larger one? 
According to Rosch’s studies, there is no single answer. Rather, there will 
be a range of options, with some fitting the conceptual category more 
closely and others less closely. It is precisely this flexibility in considering 
“contenders” for a certain category that can be seen in texts quite 
frequently. Consider the following examples taken from the second 
paragraph of this paper: “Thanks to the studies conducted by Eleanor 
Rosch (…) on conceptual categories, we now understand that categories do 
not have sharp boundaries (…). Her discovery entails that categories are 
organised around prototypes, or ‘best’ or ‘most typical’ examples.” (Italics 
added.) 
The word “discovery” in the first example is used to recover the 
previous sentence in its entirety. It provides a sort of label for the studies 
and the results, and effectively creates a relationship of inclusion, or 
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superordination, between the referent and “discovery”. The interesting 
point here is not just that one of the lexical relationships has been 
successfully set up, but also that the choice of superordinate carries added 
meaning, since “discovery” conveys positive evaluation. More factual 
terms would have been finding, investigation or research. In referring to 
Rosch’s studies as a hyponym to the superordinate “discovery”, the text is 
equating her discovery with other discoveries the reader may have in 
mind, and resort to, in order to make sense of why Rosch’s studies merit 
such a distinction. Naturally, the reader may find fault with the choice of 
term and decide Rosch’s findings should be taken with a pinch of salt and 
not given such an important status, but in doing so the reader will also 
have linked the two portions of text as superordinate and hyponym. Here’s 
another example taken from the same paragraph: “In this context, it 
becomes tempting to postulate language is an excessively tricky tool for 
communication.” (Italics added.)  
In this case, the superordinate-hyponym relationship is the same, with 
the hyponym “language” being subsumed under the superordinate phrase 
“an excessively tricky tool for communication”. In this example, there 
seems to be a more complex cognitive leap between the two. Given the 
wider reference of the superordinate phrase, the language user is directed 
to interpret “language” in a new light, as a more “normal” superordinate 
would have been “means of communication” rather than “tool”. The choice 
of a novel superordinate forces the language user to treat “tool” 
figuratively and map certain features of the term that may be applied to 
“language”, as the concept of “tool” here is clearly not that of a machine 
operated by hand but rather something with very specific design features 
meant to fulfil a definite purpose. 
It should be noted that in both cases, that of “discovery” and “an 
excessively tricky tool for communication,” the type of co-hyponyms that 
may be called up are quite varied. But if we view them as the instantiation 
of a superordinate-hyponym relationship, we are induced to find the 
cognitive relationship between the two in order to make sense of the 
meaning. Despite the complexity or the novelty, comprehension does take 
place thanks to the superordinate-hyponym link that was set up. 
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2.2. Holonymy 
This lexical relationship, though similar to that of superordinate-
hyponym in that it entails a hierarchical imbalance, is somewhat different. 
This is because the holonym includes a limited number of co-meronyms 
which together make up the whole. Such is the relationship that hammer, 
pedal, wheels, keys, pins, strings have with “piano”. In this sense, the parts of 
the whole can be quite different from one another, as opposed to co-
hyponyms which share several features. Because meronyms are parts of a 
whole, they are frequently associated with having a specific role or function 
as regards the holonym. Moreover, since the class is initially closed, it is 
understood that adding a new “part” may involve possible minor changes 
to the whole, without essentially changing its entity, such as the similar but 
different co-meronyms for “telephone” and “cordless telephone”. This 
peculiar link can be seen in the following example: “While it seems to be 
quite evident that language is inherently vague and fuzzy, this 
indeterminacy may be countered by something that functions as part of a 
veritable system of checks and balances, otherwise known as linguistic 
context.” (Italics added.)  
Average language users are aware of what the system of checks and 
balances is in very general terms, and they understand it is a system by 
which the three branches of government stop one another from exerting 
excessive power. This system of three is part of the constitution in many 
democratic countries, and it involves a limited number of actions that each 
branch has at its disposal to resort to in case the need arises. This 
knowledge, though vague, allows language users to understand “linguistic 
context” is not one of those checks and balances as the text is not about 
government. However, the relationship between “linguistic context” as a 
likely part of the holonym “system of checks and balances” has been set up, 
and it is possible to make sense of it by understanding that linguistic 
context is capable of exerting limits on the interpretation of meaning.The 
fact that the text is silent as regards which could be the other two systems 
that exert checks and balances apart from linguistic context is irrelevant. 
The meaning that has been activated through the holonym-meronym 
relationship is clearly restricted to the idea that indeterminacy in language 
is difficult to deal with, but that at least there are a few systems, and one of 
them is “linguistic context”, that can come to the aid of the unwary 
language user. 
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2.3. Synonymy 
Synonymy in texts is usually restricted to a stylistic feature, and as 
such it is frequently known as elegant variation. This phrase points to a 
change of words intended to make a text more attractive, and it is therefore 
based on the concept that repetition is unattractive and thus should be 
avoided. Irrespective of the interest in tastefulness, the cognitive link set up 
between synonyms is that they are to be perceived as being 
interchangeable, and very much in the same way superordinates and 
holonyms do, synonyms may entail another cognitive leap. Here’s another 
example taken from this paper: 
This is why, for example, when people think of a penguin they 
rarely believe it is the most frequent representative of the category 
of birds but sparrows and robins are. Seen from a different 
perspective, this means that when language users try to interpret a 
conceptual category they are capable of handling a range of 
possibilities that go from very good examples, such as apple or 
orange as ‘fruit’, to less good examples, such as tomato or lemon that 
fit the conceptual category in question more or less accurately. 
(Underlining added.) 
The reader of this text is led to infer that “people” and “language 
users” have the same referent. How is this inference possible when, in fact, 
the two expressions are not precisely equivalent? It is the text that has set 
up a relationship of equality because for the purposes of understanding the 
message, the concept “people” is only considered in terms of their ability to 
communicate through language, and all other abilities and qualities and 
properties that define people as people are irrelevant in the context. 
2.4. Antonymy 
This lexical relationship is one of opposition, which means it can be 
explained negatively. Antonymy is basically the opposite of synonymy, so 
if synonymy entails a relationship of sameness, antonymy is based on 
difference. Sameness involves a perfect match, and any variation, whether 
small or large, entails difference. Antonymy thus covers a much wider 
spectrum. Significantly, the literature gives greater attention to this lexical 
relation. In fact, so varied is the topic of antonymy that studies do not agree 
on a single taxonomy (see, for example, Cruse, 2000, p. 197; Geeraerts, 2010, 
p. 85 and Jeffries, 2010, p. 19). Despite the complexity of antonymy, some 
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cases are rather straightforward and involve an either/or relationship, as 
can be seen in the following example: “As stated in the introductory 
paragraph, sense relations have been studied mostly in isolation, but they 
may also be successfully studied in linguistic context.” (Italics added.) 
There are possibly several of ways of studying something, but as 
regards lexical sense relations the two settings, in isolation or in context, are 
contrasted as seemingly the two only options, particularly as yielding 
different, contrasting, results. An important factor as regards meaning that 
should not be neglected when analysing antonymy is that while it may be 
vague as regards what exactly the difference is, it is very clear as to what it 
is not. The basic meaning to be made of opposition is “not that”, but the 
main job is to work out what it specifically entails. 
3. Conclusion 
The previous and rather brief analysis has attempted to draw attention 
to the significance of studying sense relations in current language use in 
order to view context in a new light as crucial to meaning. For long, applied 
linguists have maintained word sense is an illusion (Kilgarriff, 2003; Hanks, 
2008). In the field of cognitive linguistics, Jean Aitchison (2012) says the 
vast majority of psychologists have abandoned the idea that word meaning 
involves any straightforward imagery and that underspecification is a basic 
quality of language. On the other hand, language users have developed the 
ability to extend the application of words so that they can map stored 
meanings on novel situations and infer senses as they interact. But out of 
the richness and variety of options available for interpretation, how is it 
possible to home in on the right interpretation? It seems exploring lexical 
relations in text may be truly worth our while. 
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